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The Inevitability of National Treatment
of Foreign Direct Investment with
Increasingly Few and Narrow
Exceptions
Don Wallace, Jr.* & David B. Bailey**
Introduction
National treatment for foreign direct investment is a rather modest norm
against the background of post-World War II developments in international
trade, investment, and related areas at both the national and international
levels.'
The focus of the Cornell International Law Journal Symposium is on
the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) currently being
negotiated in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD). This Article is not, however, limited to the draft provisions
of the MAI. It addresses relevant norms and their evolution, regardless of
the source.2
This Article does not address the politics of foreign investment and
multinational corporations that were much in the air at the symposium.
Some people, including environmentalists and those concerned with the
conditions of workers, dislike foreign investment. The facts are more com-
plex, however. There is a near universal desire among the ever-growing
numbers of people in the world for a better life, including a better material
life. Ironically, many people in society take production and producers for
granted, but as the late Paul Tsongas once said, "you can't have employees
without employers." 3 Similarly, it would seem, you can't have the good life
* Chairman, International Law Institute and Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center.
** J.D. Candidate, May 1999, Georgetown University Law Center; A.B., Duke
University, 1994.
1. The international developments started, for all intents and purposes, with the
Bretton Woods institutions. These institutions include the World Bank (also called the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)), the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the World
Trade Organization (WTO), although the GATT was not technically conceived at Bretton
Woods.
2. While the fate of the MAI is uncertain, the comparable provisions of other docu-
ments, such as those creating or constituting the WTO, General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), GATT, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), are
instructive for our purposes.
3. William J. Reedy, Government Doesn't Create Jobs, Industry Does, THE RECORD,
Mar. 21, 1993, at 003.
31 CORNELL IN'L J. 615 (1998)
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without the producers of it.
Other objective factors are also relevant to this subject. For investors,
especially industrial investors, significant factors include the product life
cycle, oligopoly and competitive behavior, local competition, and the need
for market presence near the customer. For host governments, significant
factors include reassessing the legitimacy of their roles, with governments
making way for the private sector, even as they assert their "sovereignty"
and possibly even improve their regulatory capacity with respect to some
economic sectors.
I. Foreign Direct Investment in General
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been defined as investment where an
investor based in one country acquires an asset in another country with the
intention to manage that asset.4 Thus, FDI involves the creation of new
businesses and involves the ownership and control of enterprise abroad,
whether in branch or subsidiary form. FDI is more than just "portfolio
investment" and capital flows. Historically, investment was not part of the
GATT agenda, but beginning with the 1958 Treaty of Rome, free invest-
ment has been a cornerstone of the movement towards free trade and mar-
ket access.5 Most countries want FDI, and most FDI is among advanced
countries anyway, so "activist" ideas are somewhat off point.
Negotiations with respect to foreign direct investment no longer exist
in isolation. They are now driven by and are part of the larger trade negoti-
ation agenda. It was not always so: in the post World War II era, the initial
concern was investment protection against expropriation, followed later by
the desire of lesser-developed countries (LDCs) to create a "new interna-
tional economic order" to replace the Bretton Woods System. LDCs wanted
this new international economic order to include codes (the negotiation of
which some thought would give rise to "soft law") that would control mul-
tinational corporations (MNCs) and their practices and have a general
redistributive effect.
The current agenda is broadly a continuation of the Bretton Woods
approach of progressive liberalization (i.e. the ultimate elimination of all
barriers to market access for all foreign economic actors in all sectors).
This involves a "ratchet" principle, in that barriers once removed will not
be restored, and continuous rounds of negotiations will whittle away barri-
ers. There may be phase-in periods for LDCs and certain government
measures may remain, including national currencies and exchange rates,
but their operation must be "non-discriminatory." Private barriers (i.e.
anti-competitive conditions) are not yet being challenged, but the day may
4. WTO Secretariat, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, PRESS/57, at 6 (Oct. 9,
1996).
5. A crucial fact about FDI is that the lesser-developed countries (LDCs) mostly
want and need it desperately. Ironically, most FDI is, with the exception of oil, gas, and
minerals, still among developed countries. See ORGANIsAxON FOR ECONOMIC COOPERA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), FOREIGN DIRECT INvESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT: LESSONS FROM SIX EMERGING ECONOMIES (1998).
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come when governments will be required to have and enforce anti-trust
laws. And with the new WTO GATS, detailed domestic regulation will
increasingly become a center of attention.
Thus, Article XX of the GATT and its epigone wil require a policing of
regulation.6 For example, under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPM), nations cannot discriminate
against imports of another country's beef just because it contains "hor-
mones;" those hormones must be shown to be scientifically objectionable
according to an accepted risk assessment.
Even while regulation is being disciplined, other parts of the WTO
require it. GATS requires domestic regulation for sectors such as telecom-
munications to ensure non-discriminatory and transparent inplementa-
tion. Meanwhile, environmental protection and core labor rights are
struggling, largely unsuccessfully to date, to find their place in this trade
agenda.7
While the quotas and tariffs of GATT focused on the border, the focus
of trade policy is now moving inland behind border tariffs and quotas, as
in TRIPs,8 the AGP (procurement) and GATS. GATS is especially relevant
because Articles I and XVI (market access) 9 explicitly cover establishment
(although not using the word), which is a key to FDI.
6. See, e.g., GATT Dispute Panel Report Concerning United States Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna ("Tuna-Dolphin Case"), DS21/R - 39S/155, 1991 GATTPD LEXIS 1
(Sept. 3, 1991) (holding that U.S. embargo on tuna imports from Mexico in the name of
environmental regulation was disguised discrimination); Uruguay Round Trade Agree-
ments, Sept. 27, 1994, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1381 [hereinafter SPM] (limiting food safety,
animal and plant health regulations to those based on "scientific justification" or "an
appropriate risk assessment"); Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, Sept. 27, 1994,
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 120 [hereinafter
TBT] (limiting trade barriers to those following "international standards.").
7. See, e.g., NAFTA Article 1114(1), which shows a sensitivity to environmental
issues. North American Free Trade agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1114(1), U.S.-Mex.-
Can., 32 1.L.M. 296 and 32 l.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1998). "Nothing in this
agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party from adopting ... any
measure ... that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its terri-
tory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns." Id. In the negotia-
tions on the MAI, one delegation proposed to include this language in the MAI as well.
Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: The
MAI Negotiating Text (last modified Dec. 14, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/
mai/negtext.htm> [hereinafter MAI Negotiating Text].
8. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 3(1) [here-
inafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INsTRUMENT - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
9. GATS Article I provides:
2. For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply
of a service: (a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other
Member; (b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any
other Member; (c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial
presence in the territory of any other Member; (d) by a service supplier of one
Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of
any other Member.
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Some "progressive liberalization" precedents apply to foreign direct
investment, although they are typically of limited coverage and do not
include LDCs. These precedents include the 1958 Treaty of Rome as
amended, the 1961 OECD Codes on Liberalization of Current Invisibles
and of Capital Movements, 10 the 1976 OECD Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises (including the National Treat-
ment Instrument establishing national treatment), bilateral investment
treaties, and the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMs) (which does cover LDCs).
These "progressive liberalization" precedents typically include most
favored nation (MFN) and national treatment provisions requiring that
"like" products receive non-discriminatory treatment." The interpretation
of the word "like" is critical to an analysis of these precedents. Although
there are some precedents for what "like" means for goods,12 the term is
less clear with respect to matters more intricate than goods. How will these
norms play out with respect to services, service providers, and most cru-
cially for the purposes of this article, investments and investors?
This Article assumes that the various concepts and definitions (e.g.,
"like circumstances") in the MAI, GATS, and NAFTA are in pari materia
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 44, 48 [hereinafter
GATS].
And Article XVI provides:
With respect to market access through the modes of supply identified in Article
I, each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member
treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms, limitations
and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.
Id.
10. See, e.g., OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Markets (1961), art. 1(a):
Members shall progressively abolish between one another, in accordance with
the provisions of Article 2 [measures of liberalisation], restrictions on move-
ments of capital to the extent necessary for effective economic co-operation.
Measures designed to eliminate such restrictions are hereinafter called "meas-
ures of liberalisation."
11. For example, GATS Article XVII provides:
1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service
suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of
services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like serv-
ices and service suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph 1 by according to services
and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment
or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like services and
service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be
less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of services
or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppli-
ers of any other Member.
GATS, supra note 9, art., XVII, at 1601; see also NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1102.
12. The 1947 GATT Article III talked about "like" products. See, e.g., GATT Dispute
Panel Report on Spain-Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, June 11, 1981, GATT
B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) at 102 (1981) (holding that Spain impermissibly discriminated
between "like" products when it imposed different duties on different kinds of coffee,
because coffee is universally regarded as a well-defined and single product).
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unless otherwise noted. With respect to the MAI itself, the operation of the
dispute resolution provisions may in the future provide some uniformity of
meaning.13
II. National Treatment of FDI
A number of possible norms might apply to FDI: total laissez faire for both
domestic and foreign investors, with no government measures (similar to
the U.S. situation); absolute minimum standards for foreign (and domes-
tic) investors (e.g., no expropriation, or none without compensation); or no
discrimination (e.g., MFN and national treatment, whichever yields the
best result for the investor). The MAI and other treaties call for the last
option.
Article 1 of the MAI, for example, provides:
1. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contracting
Party and to their investments, treatment no less favorable than the treat-
ment it accords [in like circumstances] to its own investors and their invest-
ments with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, operation,
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, and sale or other disposition of
investments.
2. Each Contracting party shall accord to investors of another Contracting
party and to their investments, treatment no less favorable than the treat-
ment it accords [in like circumstances] to investors of any other Contracting
Party or of a non-Contracting Party, and to the investments of investors of
any other Contracting Party or of a non-Contracting Party ....
3. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contracting
Party and to their investments the better of the treatment required by Arti-
cles 1.1 and 1.2, whichever is the more favorable to those investors or-
investments.
The national treatment provisions of the MAI apply to all three phases
of FDI - entry, operations, and breakdown.
This Article first discusses national treatment. It then proceeds to the
subject of exceptions, both general and specific.
A. A Modest Norm
As people learn more about national treatment, 14 they may begin to appre-
ciate the true "modesty" of this modest norm. The MAI provision makes
13. MAI Negotiating Text Article V provides for dispute settlement procedures for
state-state disputes and for investor-state disputes. State-state disputes may be resolved
by consultations between parties or by arbitration in an ad hoc tribunal, whose mem-
bers may be appointed by the parties or by the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID). The ad hoc tribunal shall decide disputes in accordance
with the MAI as interpreted in accordance with the applicable rules of international law.
Investor-state disputes should be settled, if possible, by negotiation or consultation, or
by any competent court of the State Party or by arbitration in accordance with the ICSID
Convention. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V.
14. Historically, trade lawyers dealt much more with MFN. See generally STAiNLEY
METZGER, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE KENNEDY ROUND 39-54 (1964); Michael Borrus &
Judith Goldstein, United States Trade Protectionism: Institutions, Norms, and Practices, 8
J. INT'L L. Bus. 328 (1987).
Cornell International Law Journal
clear, as do most versions of national treatment, that it applies only in
cases of "like circumstances" (MFN is also limited to "like circum-
stances").15 Of course, the determination of "like circumstances" lies in
the application.
Although the GATT never directly addressed foreign investment until
the Uruguay Round, earlier cases suggest some movement towards national
treatment for FDI. In the GATT Panel Report on the U.S.-Canada Dispute
on the Administration of Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act (Canada
Act), 16 the United States alleged that the Canada Act resulted in differential
treatment of imports by U.S. investors in manufacturing operations in Can-
ada. The United States claimed this differential treatment prevented their
imports from competing fairly with Canadian products. The GATT Panel
found that the requirements of the Canada Act were inconsistent with the
national treatment provisions of Article 111(4) of GATT.17 The Panel's hold-
ing was limited to the issue of whether less favorable treatment was
accorded to imported products than that accorded to like products of Cana-
dian origin, but bore directly on FDI because the injured parties were U.S.
investors and because the decision removed a "performance requirement"
from foreign investment. 18
Examples abound of countries moving toward national treatment even
outside the framework of GATT/WTO. The United States has entered into
numerous bilateral investment treaties with other nations, which typically
provide for national treatment for direct and indirect investment.19 There
has been significant liberalization of investment with Mexico since the
1973 Investment Treaty. Other bilateral investment treaties (BITs), most
15. See, e.g., MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. I; GATS, supra note 9, art. XVII;
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) art, III, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188,
reprinted in GATT, BAsIc INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DocumErrs, 4th Supp. 1 (1964);
NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 301.
16. GATT Dispute Panel Report Concerning the Administration of Canada's Foreign
Investment Review Act, L/5504-30S/140, 1983 GATTPD LEXIS 8.
17. The Canada Act required foreign investors, such as those who sought to set up
manufacturing operations in Canada, (a) to purchase goods of Canadian origin in pref-
erence to imported goods, and (b) to manufacture in Canada goods which would be
otherwise imported. Id. at 13.
18. The panel understood that there were larger effects on foreign investment, but
did not address them because they were not provided for in GATT.
As to the extent to which purchase requirements reflect plans of the investors,
the Panel does not consider it relevant nor does it feel competent to judge how
the foreign investors are affected by the purchase requirements, as the national
treatment obligations of Article III of the General Agreement do not apply to
foreign persons or firms but to imported products and serve to protect the inter-
ests of producers and exporters established on the territory.
Id. at 61.
19. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment:
Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities associated therewith,
on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to investment or
associated activities of its own nationals or companies, or of nationals or compa-
nies of any third country, whichever is the more favorable, subject to the right of
each Party to make or maintain exceptions falling within one of the sectors or
matters listed in the Protocol to this Treaty.
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notably NAFTA Chapter 11,20 provide for national treatment of FDI in
"like circumstances." Although LDCs have long resisted unrestricted FDI
by multinational enterprises (MNEs), LDCs like India have taken
independent measures towards liberalization. India recently has begun to
increase the allowable percentage of foreign equity ownership for FDI in
some sectors.
2 1
What does national treatment in "like circumstances" require? Some
recent examples from the WTO's GATS are instructive.
Recently, members of the WTO implemented the so-called Basic Tele-
communications Agreement (BTA).2 2 Some have suggested that the BTA
violates the national treatment requirements of GATS Article XVII, but is
this critique correct? The Reference Paper,2 3 and the November 1997 Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) Foreign Participation Order,
which implemented U.S. compliance with the BTA,2 4 seem to free the
United States from both MFN and national treatment obligations where a
foreign applicant poses a "high competitive risk" to the U.S. market.
A closer examination suggests that the United States may not be so
free. There are at least two possible scenarios. The first scenario is that of
a foreign "crook" attempting to infiltrate the U.S. market. However, a U.S.
national "crook" would no more get a license than a foreign one. The sec-
ond scenario may be more subtle. For example, a foreigner with "deep
pockets" may operate in a home country that does not freely admit foreign-
ers, with the result that it may be uniquely protected, even subsidized. 2 5 In
20. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protections of Invest-
ment, Nov. 14, 1991, U.S.-Arg., art. II(1), S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-11 (1992). NAFTA
Article 1102 provides:
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.
4. For greater certainty, no Party may:
(a) impose on an investor of another Party a requirement that a minimum
level of equity in an enterprise in the territory of the Party be held by its
nationals, other than nominal qualifying shares for directors or incorpora-
tors of corporations; or
(b) require an investor of another Party, by reason of its nationality, to sell
or otherwise dispose of an investment in the territory of the Party.
NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 1102.
21. See Eric M. Burt, Note and Comment, Developing Countries and the Framework
for Negotiations on Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade Organization, 12 Am. U.J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 1015 (1997).
22. Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 30, 1996,
36 I.L.M. 366 (entered into force Feb. 17, 1997) (WTO Basic Telecom Agreement).
23. See Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles, in CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L
STUDIEs, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON WTO AGREEMENT ON BASIC TELEOMMUNICATIONS
11-12 (1997);John H. Harwood II et al., Competition in International Telecommunications
Services, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 874 (1997).
24. FCC Foreign Participation Order, IB Docket No. 97-142 (Nov. 25, 1997).
25. The Foreign Participation Order provides:
[I]n exceptional circumstances, entry into the U.S. market by an applicant affili-
ated with a foreign telecommunications carrier from a WTO Member may pose
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such a case, a foreign applicant attempting to enter the U.S. market is
surely not in "like circumstances" with a U.S. national competitor.
Additionally, some suggest that the reference to "prudential measures"
in both the MAI and the GATS Annex on financial services is an exception
to national treatment. 26 But, again, a closer examination suggests that this
may not be so. If Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) had
been restricted in some ways by the "prudential measures" language, would
not Continental Illinois also have been in "like circumstances"?27
Similar instances of seeming non-national treatment will likely occur,
and the related market access provisions of the GATS and other treaties will
seemingly be violated. Thus, U.S. anti-trust laws may limit foreigners, but
the critical issue will be whether U.S. nationals receive the same treatment
in like circumstances. 28 There will be other questions of the application of
national treatment. For example, what does "national treatment" mean for
an American company in the Canadian province of Manitoba? Should it be
given the same treatment as a Manitoban, or will the same treatment as a
company from British Columbia suffice?29
III. Exceptions
The matter of exceptions is a vexing part of the ongoing MAI negotiations.
However, the exceptions will likely be kept to a minimum and narrowed,
both in negotiations and in application. While the proposed MAI goes far-
ther than most of its predecessors in narrowing the exceptions to national
treatment, commentators have noted several variables that allow flexibility
competitive risks by virtue of the applicant's ability to exercise market power in
a relevant foreign market ... We find that our safeguards will be adequate to
detect and deter such conduct in virtually all circumstances ... [I]n the excep-
tional case where an application poses a very high risk to competition in the
U.S. market, where our safeguards and conditions would be ineffective, we
reserve the right to deny an application. We therefore will presume that an
application does not pose a risk of competitive harm that would justify denial
unless it is shown that granting the application would pose such a very high risk
to competition.
Id. 1i51.
26. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VII(1) ("a Contracting Party shall not
be prevented from taking prudential measures with respect to financial services, includ-
ing measures for the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to
whom a fiduciary duty is owed.., or to ensure the integrity and stability of its financial
system").
27. David Warsh, Bank of Credit Affair Hardly a Surprise in International Banking
Circles, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 1991, at 9.
28. The same is true for employment discrimination laws. See Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc. v. Avagliano et al., 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (holding that the U.S.-based sub-
sidiary of a Japanese corporation is treated as a U.S. corporation for the purpose of
employment discrimination lawsuits).
29. See Matthew Schaefer, NAFTA Revisited: Searching for Pareto Gains in the Rela-
tionship Between Free Trade and Federalism: Revisiting the NAFTA, Eyeing the FTAA, 23
CAN.-U.S. LJ. 441 (1997).
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in the implementation of the MAI.30 Regarding exceptions, the experience
of GATT offers instructive lessons.
The exceptions under consideration are of two types: general, across-
the-board exceptions (applied on an MFN basis, without reciprocity); and
country-specific exceptions, which are sometimes applied reciprocally
against countries with similar exceptions. The former exception type will
often arise from applying domestic regulation to foreign and domestic
investors and may not necessarily violate national treatment because of
"unlike circumstances." Such domestic regulation will be the increasing
focus of many market access questions.
A. General Exceptions
Among the general exceptions much bruited are national security, culture,
and public order/police power.
1. National Security
National security exceptions arose from Cold War concerns. During the
Cold War, the GATT allowed countries to define national security restric-
tions on their own terms. 3 1 National security is, however, a relative con-
cept that changes as international relations change. For instance, the U.S.
Department of Defense approved a license for production of F-16 fighters
by the same Japanese company that built the Zeros that bombed Pearl Har-
bor during World War I.32
Today, a national security exception may still be proper, but not when
its scope is unreasonably broad. Instead, an exception premised on
national security should be narrowed or fine-tuned. For example, the U.S.
Department of Defense "security clearance" can be satisfied by foreign con-
tractors through "voting trusts" and other means.3 3 Similarly, the Exon-
Florio Amendment would bar otherwise permissible foreign investment in
30. See Presentation from Marinus Sikkel, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Nether-
lands, Exceptions, Derogations and National Reservations, Symposium on the MAI in
Cairo, Egypt (Oct. 20, 1997):
Realising that, in order to achieve a high level Agreement it is necessary to pro-
vide for some flexibility, the negotiators have foreseen six types of provisions
which will enable the signatories to derogate from the principles of the
agreement:
1) Certain limitations in the definition.
2) General exceptions under which States would have the possibility to take the
measures necessary to ensure compliance with certain general objectives.
3) [A] temporary derogation clause in case of serious problems with the balance
of payments could be inserted.
4) Prudential measures which give the Contracting Parties the possibility to
ensure the integrity and stability of their financial system.
5) Taxation is generally not covered by the MAI. A so-called carve-out/ carve-in
approach is followed....
31. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XXI(a)-(c).
32. James P. Chandler, The Loss of New Technology to Foreign Competitors: U.S. Com-
panies Must Search for Protective Solutions, 27 GEo. WAsH.J. INr'L L. & EcoN. 305 (1994).
33. A voting trust agreement attempts to eliminate the possibility of foreign investors
gaining access to classified information or interfering with classified contracts. See Mel-
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Intel if foreign ownership would constitute "clear interference" with U.S.
national security interests.3 4
Article VI(1)-(2) of the MAI Negotiating Text still provides a general
exception for national security concerns:
Nothing in [the MAI] shall be construed:
a. to prevent any Contracting Party from taking any action which it consid-
ers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests ... ;35
b. to require any Contracting Party to furnish or allow access to any infor-
mation the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security
interests;
c. to prevent any Contracting Party from taking any action in pursuance of
its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security. 36
2. Culture
General cultural exceptions are sometimes allowed. NAFTA provides for an
exception to national treatment of foreign investment between Canada and
the United States for "cultural industries."3 7 Cultural industries include
those involved in the production, distribution, and sale of publications,
audio and video recordings, music, and broadcasting. 3 8 In the Canada-
U.S. dispute on Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, the United
States won the right to publish a Canadian edition of Sports Illustrated by
appealing directly to the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, thereby avoiding
the NAFTA cultural industries exception.39
Similarly, the European Community responded to what it perceived as
an imminent cultural crisis by enacting the "Television Without Frontiers"
directive in 1989. The Directive required public and private networks of
member states to set aside at least fifty percent of their total airtime for
vin Rishe, Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence: The Implications for United States
Companies Performing Defense Contracts, 20 PUB. CoNT. LJ. 143, 152 (1991).
34. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1998); HenryJ. Graham, Foreign Investment Laws of
China and the United States: A Comparative Study, 5J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 253 (1996).
35. Subsection 2(a) limits these interests to those:
(i) taken in time of war... ;
(ii) relating to the implementation of national policies respecting the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
(iii) relating to the production of arms and ammunition.
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(2)(a).
36. Id. art. VI(2).
37. NAFTA, supra note 7, annex 2106 (Cultural Industries):
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, as between Canada and
the United States, any measure adopted or maintained with respect to cultural
industries, except as specifically provided in Article 302 (Market Access - Tariff
Elimination), and any measure of equivalent commercial effect taken in
response, shall be governed under this Agreement exclusively in accordance
with the provisions of the Canada - United States Free Trade Agreement.
38. Id. art. 2107.
39. WTO, Report of the Panel in Canada- Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,
WT/DS31/R (Mar. 14, 1997).
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"European works."40 In the pre-Uruguay Round world, this restriction was
not prohibited by GATT because broadcasting represented a "service" and
not a "product."4 1 France and Canada carried over their existing reserva-
tions in their Uruguay Round commitments to the GATS and have sought a
broad cultural industries exception in the MAI. Most delegations, however,
do not support a cultural industries exception in the MAI, and the MAI
Negotiating Text does not provide for one.
3. Public Order/Police Power
Exceptions for "public order" and police powers seem to be the key area of
contention. Public order is vulnerable to being exaggerated beyond reason-
able bounds. The public order exception is the subject of GATT Article XX,
GATS Article VI, and the proposed MAI Article VI.
A broad exception for public order is becoming an anachronism. The
concept of "big government" dissolved during the Reagan and Thatcher
era, so it is less likely that national treatment will result in any loss of
sovereignty. But in the era of shrinking government power, there will
always be regulation. The Federal Drug Administration (FDA), the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA), and GATT Article XX, among others,
still allow trade protection, either explicitly or implicitly. The Uruguay
Round Agreements on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
(SPM) and on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) narrow this substantially,
but still allow for escape valves. 42 How will this apply to national treat-
ment of FDI?
GATT Article XX(2), for example, provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restric-
tion on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of [necessary
measures to protect public order]. 4 3
GATS Article VI likewise requires the even-handed application of
40. Council Directive 89/552 on Television without Frontiers, art. 1(a), 1989 OJ. (L
298) 23.
41. See Case 155/73, State v. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. 409,427 (1974), affd, Case 52/79,
Procureur du Roi v. MarcJ.V.C. Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. 833, 835 (1981) (European Court
of Justice (ECJ) holding television programming and production is a service industry,
not a product).
42. See WTO Agreement, supra note 8.
43. GATT, supra note 15, art. XX(2). These "necessary measures" include those:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to
customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under para-
graph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices...
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domestic regulation.44 Even in the era of privatization of infrastructure,
regulation will continue in such sectors as telecommunication rates, road
safety, and road expansion.
But regulation may still be condemned if it rises to the level of a "regu-
latory taking," or "creeping expropriation" of an investment. As Justice
Holmes defined the "regulatory taking" concept in Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon, "the general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing."4 5 Holmes also noted that some property values "are enjoyed under
an implied limitation and must yield to the police power ... [b]ut obvi-
ously the implied limitation must have its limits .... "46 Such "takings" fall
within the coverage of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (IBRD), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and
"expropriation insurance" under the Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion (OPIC). 4 7
The proposed MAI illustrates a conscious narrowing of the public
order exception. The MAI Negotiating Text Article VI(3) provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between Contracting Parties, or a disguised investment restriction, nothing
in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Contracting Party from
taking any measure necessary for the maintenance of public order.4 8
The Commentary to the MAI Negotiating Text illustrates the ambiva-
lence among the delegations towards the necessity and scope of the public
order exception. Some delegations feel an exception for public order is
necessary to ensure the application of a country's criminal laws, anti-ter-
rorist measures, and money laundering regulations. 49 Other delegations
Id.
44. GATS Article VI:
Domestic Regulation
1. In sectors where specific commitments are undertaken, each Member shall
ensure that all measures of general application affecting trade in services are
administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner...
GATS, supra note 9, art. VI.
45. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). This concept was
expressed even more succinctly in Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc. v.
Andrus, 443 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980) ("the power to regulate is also the power to
destroy").
46. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
47. OPIC defines expropriation as "any abrogation, repudiation, or impairment by a
foreign government of its own contract with an investor with respect to a project, where
such abrogation, repudiation, or impairment is not caused by the investor's own fault or
misconduct, and materially adversely affects the continued operation of the project." 22
U.S.C. § 2198(b) (1998).
48. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(3). Note 2 of this section further
narrows the exception by providing that it may only be invoked "where a genuine and
sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society."
49. The MAI Negotiating Text also provides for a general exception for transactions
in pursuit of monetary and exchange rate policies. MAI Article VI(2.1) provides: "Arti-
cles XX (National Treatment), YY (Most Favored Nation Treatment) and ZZ (Trans-
parency) do not apply to transactions carried out in pursuit of monetary or exchange
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argue that no discrimination between foreign and domestic investors is
necessary to protect these goals.50 As discussed above, a foreign crook
who is subject to a nation's criminal laws is still receiving "national treat-
ment." The MAI exception is further narrowed because it is not self-
defined and is subject to rigorous scrutiny under the MAI's dispute settle-
ment procedures.
B. Country-Specific Exceptions
Are there international patterns of country-specific exceptions? Govern-
ment research grants, foreign assistance programs, restrictions with respect
to nuclear areas, French films, droit d'auteur, cabotage, minerals, land, and
media have all been subjects of country-specific exceptions. Questions
remain as to how countries should handle these. In the field of public
procurement, countries still protect minority set-asides, as well as domestic
preferences and set-asides. For example, should Indonesia unconditionally
award preferential contracts to Indonesian firms if their bids are no more
than ten percent above a foreign bid? We can see that such programs are
being narrowed by the BTA, the MAI Financial Services Annex, and the
European Union (EU). 5 ' A future goal will be to fine tune these excep-
tions, and then narrow them even more.
In the United States, there are several degrees of restriction on FDI.
There may be total prohibition from FDI in certain sectors (nuclear power,
maritime activities), allowed subject to strict regulation (airlines, financial
services, communications), and allowed subject to limits on equity owner-
ship (limit to minority shares). The United States has already narrowed
restrictions even in these areas. Financial services has moved furthest of
any sector in the direction of national treatment in the United States.52
The United States has also shown its willingness to support WTO liberali-
zation measures.5 3
The MAI allows country-specific exceptions. The MAI Negotiating
Text provides that national treatment and MFN shall not apply to: "(a) any
existing non-conforming measure as set out by a Contracting Party in its
schedule to Annex A of the Agreement, to the extent that the measure is
maintained, continued or promptly renewed in its legal system."5 4
The MAI Negotiating Text notes that this language is intended to clar-
ify that foreign investors should benefit from any liberalization measure as
soon as the relevant law, regulation, or practice enters into force.55
rate policies by a central bank or monetary authority of a Contracting Party." MAI Nego-
tiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(2.1).
50. Id. art. VI(3) cmt.
51. See OECD, OECD REviEws op FOREIGN DiRECT INvEsTmENT: UNITED STATES
(1995).
52. DEPARTMENT oF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL TREATMENT STUDY 1994, at 10-11
(1994).
53. See id.
54. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IX(Country-Specific Exceptions), 1 A
(emphasis added).
55. Id.
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Thus we see the "ratchet" effect once again. The MAI Negotiating Text
further provides that each listed exception must set out a number of ele-
ments to ensure the greatest possible transparency of the exception. In
negotiations, strong support existed for requiring, among the elements, an
explanation of the the motivation or rationale for the given exception. 56
IV. History and Prospects
While extrapolating from history is often unwise, the unmistakable pattern
of recent history with respect to the relevant international norms and the
underlying material and economic forces make extrapolations appropriate
in this case.
A. History
Historically, FDI has been approached differently by customary public
international law, on the one hand, and the WTO, on the other hand. In
considering the history of customary international law, it is useful to dis-
tinguish entry, operations, and breakdown for FDI. Customary interna-
tional law did not regulate countries' approaches to entry and operations
as they did with respect to breakdown. In recent years, treaties, as opposed
to customary law, have filled this void by regulating countries' approaches
to entry and operations.
With regard to entry, customary international law supported the posi-
tion that nations were always free to keep foreigners out. Today, the move-
ment is towards liberalization, in the form of IBRD FDI Guidelines,5 7 BITs,
and NAFTA, which establish national treatment. This signals a departure
from customary international law.
With regard to operations, customary international law dealt with reg-
ulation if it had the effect of a "creeping expropriation." However, the real
development came from the OECD Codes on Liberalisation in the 1960s,
the National Treatment Instrument in 1976, and various treaties.
The breakdown of foreign investment (expropriation, repudiation of
contracts, etc.) under customary international law was often an issue
among colonial powers rather than a real north-south interchange. 58 Pro-
tection against expropriation under customary international law included
both national treatment standards and a minimum standard of prompt,
56. Id. art. IX, § 2(g) (Introduction to Annex A of the Agreement Listing Country-
Specific Exceptions).
57. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Guidelines: Pro-
curement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits (Sept. 1997) <http://www.worldbank.org/
html/opr/procure/intro.htn>.
58. The differences between the colonial powers were in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. During the middle of the twentieth century, expropriations
occurred in the communist countries. Recently, however, prominent North-South cases
have occurred, such as the "nationalization" of Exxon oil fields in Peru in 1969 and the
taking of Kennecott Copper mines by the Chilean government in 1971. See Michael W.
Gordon, Predictability of Nationalization of Foreign Private Investment in Latin America, 1
SYRACUSE J. Irr'L L. & COMMERCE 123 (1973).
Vol. 31628
1998 National Treatment of FDI
adequate, and effective compensation.59 The Latin American "Calvo doc-
trine," for example, allowed for only national treatment with no minimum
standard of compensation and barred foreigner investors' resort to diplo-
matic remedies.60 The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
(CERDS), 61 voted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1974, represented an
attempt by LDCs to extend such an approach beyond Latin America. But
the Calvo doctrine and CERDS have subsided and there is now a larger
movement towards universalizing a minimum standard of compensation
for expropriation.
B. More History and Prospects
The WTO system, from its Bretton Woods heritage (including the OECD
and the EU), strives towards progressive liberalization. The law is now
almost entirely treaty-driven. The movement to eliminate exceptions from
the principles of national treatment and MFN has been building momen-
tum. Liberalization has come about by means of absolute requirements,
such as elimination of quotas, disciplining of subsidies, import relief safe-
guards, MFN, and national treatment standards. In the field of services,
GATS Article II calls for MFN treatment unless a country lists specific
exceptions, and GATS Article XVII calls for national treatment and is struc-
tured to make it very difficult for a country to impose exceptions and
conditions.62
Recent efforts towards liberalization observe a common pattern: limit
the exceptions to national treatment and gradually narrow those excep-
tions. For example, government procurement had been explicitly excluded
from the 1947 GATT in its Article 111(8), and represented a major gap in
multilateral trade negotiations. Procurement was not addressed until the
Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP) in the Tokyo Round in
1979 and its subsequent enlargement in the Uruguay Round in 1994.63 In
its present form, the AGP sets out detailed obligations that procuring enti-
ties must fulfill to ensure the effective application of its national treatment
principles and ensure open access. A similar sort of liberalization can be
seen in the development of GATS, the BTA and the WTO Annex on Finan-
cial Services.
59. The latter standard in U.S. BITs is sometimes called the "Hull formula."
60. See generally DONALD P. SHEA, THE CAvo CLAUSE (1955).
61. G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, 51-55, U.N. Doc. A/
9631 (1974).
62. GATS Article XVII provides:
1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service
suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of
services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like serv-
ices and service suppliers.
GATS, supra note 9, art. XVII.
63. RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE
LEGAL Taxrs, annex 4, at 438 (1995).
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For these developments, the system follows a process that the MAI
describes as "standstill" plus "rollback," whereby non-conforming meas-
ures to the national treatment principle are reduced and eventually elimi-
nated.6 4 The MAI views this as a three-step process. 65 First, specific
exceptions are to be kept consistent with new liberalization measures. Sec-
ond, non-conforming measures are to be periodically examined. Finally,
successive rounds of negotiations are to permanently remove remaining
non-conforming measures.
As the globe spins, international trade and norms roll on. National
treatment, increasingly free of crippling exceptions, will become more and
more inevitable.
64. OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Commentary to the MAI Negoti-
ating Text (last modified Dec. 14, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/
negtext.htm>.
65. This is the "ratchet" principle: any new liberalization measures are locked in and
cannot be rescinded over time ("standstill"), and then liberalized further ("rollback").
